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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
of marital rights as "adequate and full consideration..." and thus subjecting
them to the gift tax."3
The instant case, 1' which follows the majority view,'5 is the first case
on this point that has been decided by the Supreme Court. The Court
reasoned that this was merely an intelligent way of settling their respective
estates with adequate consideration on each side and not a scheme to evade
either gift or estate taxes. Consequently, the divorce decree converted it
into a legal obligation, the satisfaction of which could not be considered as
a taxable gift. However, evidence of a minority viewpoint was recognized
in the strong dissent of four Justices. 16
This decision may very well crystallize the law on this subject. How-
ever, a very small change in circumstances could alter the position of the
two views. A possible increase in the government's need for revenue could
cause a change in this rule. Such a change would be unfortunate because
this decision allows the parties to work out an intelligent division of their
property prior to a divorce decree without risking a tax burden.
TORTS - GUEST STATUTE - BAR TO CIVIL LIABILITY UNDER
ANTI-HITCHHIKING STATUTE
Two adult hitchhikers solicited a ride from the driver of a motor
vehicle. A wreck occurring soon thereafter, because of the driver's intoxi-
cated condition and reckless operation, brought death to one passenger
and serious injuries to the other. In suits for damages the driver defended
under the Guest Statute.' The Washington Anti-Hitchhiking Statute2
provides that it is unlawful to give transportation as well as to solicit it.
Held, that the guest statute, providing against recovery by an invited
passenger is not made inapplicable by the driver's violation of the anti-
hitchhiking statute. Bateman v. Ursich, 200 P.2d 314 (Wash. l0).
The Washington guest statute, in form and by court interpretation3
follows the pattern of similar statutes and interpretations in approximately
thirty other states.' It is generally agreed that such statutes are in derog-
13. Comm'r v. Barnard's Estate, snura note 10.
14. Harris v. Comm'r, 71 Sup. Ct. 181 (1950).
15. See note 7 Sunra.
16. Harris v. Comm'r, su/ra note 14, at 185.
1. WAsH. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6360-121 (1947).
2. WAsn. REv. STAT. ANN. § 6360-100 (1947).
3. Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 53 P.2d 615 (1936); Finn v, Drtina, 30 Wash.
2d 814, 194 P.2d 347 (1948).
4. Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut (repealed), Delaware,
Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Ne-
braska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wyoming, by statute. Georgia,
by court holdings, see Frank v. iorovitz, 52 Ga. App. 651, 183 S.E. 835 (1936); Moore
v. Shirley, 68 Ca. App. 38, 21 S.E.2d 925 (1942).
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ation of the common law.5 The general purpose of guest statutes is to free
the host from obligation in the case of non-paying guests,6 an issue of great
interest to insurance companies. However, the host may still be liable in
the case of intentional acts, willful or wanton misconduct, gross negligence,
recklessness, and in some states because of intoxication.7
The typical anti-hitchhiking statute, unlike the Vashington statute,
is directed only to the pedestrian, is a part of highway traffic regulations
and is often accompanied by requirements that the pedestrian shall walk
facing traffic9 or on the left side of the road.10 The Iowa statute" even
appears to sanction hitchhiking so long as the hitchhiker does not seriously
disturb traffic.
Liability may arise from violation of an anti-hitchhiking statute, but
the matter of liability is subordinate to the importance of traffic control.
Guest statutes, delineating the degree of negligence required for liability,
change the common law' 2 and operate in the field of substantive law rather
than as a part of traffic regulations."' They are manifestations of a sweep-
ing modem trend, 4 well established as one important legal solution to the
"Automobile Age." The Washington court reached a decision consonant
with the general view, despite its double-edged anti-hitchhiking statute.
That the lesser statute should suffer emasculation is a natural result.
In distinguishing its previous ruling in Upchurch v. Hubbord,'5 the
court was aided by yet another Washington statute which makes it un-
lawful to transport a person on the running board of a vehicle. However,
under this statute the passenger does not violate the law. The Upchurch
case differs factually from the principal case in that the rider, a minor, was
5. Dobbs v. Sugioka, 117 Colo. 218, 185 P.2d 784 (1947); Praeger v. Israel, 15
Cal.2d 89, 98 P.2d 729 (1940); Iles v. Larnphere, 60 Ohio App. 4, 18 N.E.2d 989(1938).
6. Russell v. Turner, 148 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1945); Bradley v. Clarke, 118 Conn.
641, 174 AtI. 72 (1934), cited and quoted in Finn v. Drtina, supra note 3; Kuger v.
Hollahan, 144 Fla. 779, 198 So. 685 (1910); Denton v. Midwest Dairy Products Corp.,
284 Ill. 279, 1 N.E.2d 807 (1936); Cummings v. Tweed, 195 S.C. 173, 10 S.E.2d 322
(1940); Mitclell v. Walters, 55 Wyo. 317, 100 P.2d 102 (1940).
7. California, Idaho, Iowa, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, Utah (by
statute).
8. E.g., COLO. STAT. ANN., c.16, § 217 (Cunt. Supp. 1947); DEL. REv. COD:,
c.165, § 113(a) (1935); IowA ConE ANN,, § 321.331 (1949). The typical statute re-
cites. "No person shall stand in any roadway ...for the purpose of soliciting a ride
from the driver of any private vehicle."
9. INo. ANN. STAT. § 47-2035 (Burns 1933) (anti-hitchhiking statute is § 47-2036).
10. ILL. ANN. STAT. c.95 , § 175 (1949) (anti-hitchhiking statute is § 174).
11. IowA CODE ANN. § 321.331 (1949) states: "This shall not be construed to
prevent a pedestrian from standing on a portion of a highway, not ordinarily used for
vehicular traffic, for the purpose of soliciting a ride from the driver of any vehicle."
12. Smith v. Pope, 53 Cal. App.2d 43, 127 P.2d 292 (1942); Biddle v. Boyd, 9
Harr. 346, 199 Atl. 479 (Del. 1938); Gill v. Arthur, 43 N.E.2d 894 (Ohio 1942).
13. Kitchens v. Duffield, 76 N.E,2d 101 (Ohio 1947).
14. See note 4 Supra; the following Canadian provinces have guest statutes: Alberta,
British Columbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Prince Edward
Island, Saskatchewan.
15. 29 Wash.2d 559, 188 P.2d 86 (1947).
16. WAs. REv. STAT. ANN. § 6369-115 (1947).
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on the running board. The court also rejected the doctrine of pari delicto,
predicating its holding on the premise that the adult hitchhikers brought
on their own misfortune by their own "illegal conduct in using the 'speaking
thumnb'."' 1 Penalizing the driver for his violation would result undesirably
in giving the original violators an advantage instead of a penalty.
The court seemed to say that the hitchhikers entrapped the kindly
motorist into an unwitting and careless act of generosity, 8 unhappily made
unlawful by the legislature, and that such entrapment suspended or rendered
nugatory the host's violation, thus transmuting his invitation into a lawful
act, The argument that the first lawbreaker cannot take advantage of the
second lawbreaker, whereas the second lawbreaker may assert the violation
of the first lawbreaker implies an estoppel, although the nature of the viola-
tion was criminal. Statutory violation has both criminal and civil aspects.
The ultimate issue here is one of civil liability.
Should the plaintiff's or the defendant's violation of a minor statute
affect the outcome? Not all legislation is enforceable under any and all
conditions. If two statutes conflict, the undoubted desire of the legislature
to effectuate substantial justice should suffice to over-ride the lesser traffic
statute in favor of the substantive type law-expressed in the guest statute.
TORTS - OVERHANGING BRANCHES - REMEDY
OF SELF HELP
Plaintiff brought a suit for damages for injury to his realty from over-
hanging branches of trees rooted in the adjoining land, and for abatement
of this nuisaucc. Held, plaintiff is not entitled to damages or an order of
abatement. The sole remedy of self-help is adequate, though limited only
to the overhanging limbs. Sterling v. Weinstein, 75 A.2d 144 (D.C. Munic.
Ct. 1950).
The overwhehning weight of authority is to the effect that self-help
is the sole remedy for overhanging branches, or invading roots, when they
are not noxious.' However, self-help does not include a license to trespass
against the adjoining owner.2 Most courts will allow recovery for injury
from noxious growths, but use the injury rather than the growth, as thc
17. Compare Bateman v. Ursich, 200 P.2d 314 (Wash. 1950) with Dashiell v.
Moore, 117 Md. 657, 11 A.2d 640 (1940).
18. Dobbs v. Sugioka, 117 Colo. 218, 219, 185 P.2d 784, 785 (1947), "This
section (§ 371, the guest statute) was enacted to prevent recovery by those having no
nsoral right to recompense, those carried for their own convenience, for their own business
or pleasure, those invited by the operator as a mere generous gesture, 'hitch-hikers' and
'bums' who sought to make a profit out of soft-hearted and unfortunate motorists."
1. Michalson v. Nutting, 275 Mass. 232, 175 N.E. 490 (1931); Cranberry v. Jones,
188 Tenn. 51, 216 S.W.2d 721 (1941); Cobb v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 90 Vt.
342, 98 At]. 758 (1916); accord, Iickey v. Michigan C.R.R., 96 Mich. 498, 55 N.V.
989 (1893) (use self-help after notice to owner of tree); see I'arndqn v. Stultz, 124 Iowa
440, 441, 10 N.W. 329, 330 (1904) (involving a line hedge); Wegener v. Sugarman,
104 N.J.L. 26, 27, 138 At], 699, 700 (1927) (where defendant's contractor completely
